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APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE
LEGISLATURE: A STUDY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Elizabeth Durfee*
"He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of
large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the
right of representation in the legislature---a right inestimable to
them and formidable to tyrants only."-Declaration of 11:dependence.

T

HIS paper is concerned with the rules found in our state constitutions for apportionment of representation in the state legislature. It
does not attempt to solve the problems of high-tension politics that are
involved in the making and remaking of such rules; it goes no deeper
than an exposition of existing rules. Even on this level it is not exhaustive. Since the constitutions exhibit manifold- variations, from
simple directions which are scarcely more than a declaration of policy
to complex rules for the formation of districts, no attempt will be made
to classify all the different types of provisions. With the basic assumption that the ideal to be sought is equal representation for all, the more
common provisions will be measured against this ideal. The tables in
the appendix set out the provisions for all the states.

I
SoME UNAVOIDABLE INEQUALITIES

Before turning to the constitutions themselves, it will be helpful to
give brief consideration to some of the general features of the problem
of apportionment, without, however, attempting to offer solutions for
all the problems raised. In setting up a scheme of apportionment, there
arises at the outset the question, how much of the population should be .
included in computing the representation. Should all residents be
counted? Or only citizens? Or only those who take the trouble to vote?
Most state constitutions specify "population" or "inhabitants" as the
basis for representation, but New York and certain other states expressly exclude aliens,1 and in some states only legal voters are count'ed.2
In Arizona, representation in the house is dependent on the number of

* A.B., University of Michigan, J.D., University of Michigan Law School. Research Assistant, University of Michigan Law School-Ed.
1
N.Y. Const. (1895), art. III,§§ 4, 5, as amended 1931.
2 E.g., Mass. Const. ( l 790), Amendment LXXI.
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votes cast for governor at the preceding election. 3 Several states exclude
tax-exempt Indians,4 while in Oregon only the white population is
counted. 5 In view of the policy of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, the exclusion of the
negro citizens is to be decried, and fortunately no state except Oregon
has written this provision into its constitution. The exclusion of aliens
or nonvoters is not open to this objection, and a state may properly exclude them if its political philosophy so dictates. The decision will depend on whether representation is deemed a right of every person subject to the legislature, or only of those who actually or potentially elect
its members.
Even with this question settled, it is, of course, impossible in practice to attain exact equality unless legislators are elected at large. Representation by districts is admittedly preferable to at-large representation, and once having divided the state into districts the inescapable interval between census and ensuing election causes some inequality even
at the outset, for births and deaths and migrations make the system of
districts obsolete as soon as it is established. But shifts of population are
not the chief cause of inequalities since in most states reapportionment
is directed to be made at sufficiently frequent intervals to compensate
for changes of population. The causes of inequality are more fundamental, springing from the constitutions themselves, and from the human frailty of the officials whose duty it is to make the reapportionment,
but who for one reason or another fail to perform this duty.
Moreover, even assuming a static population, a practical .obstacle is
encountered in any attempt to equalize representative districts. It is
impossible to disregard entirely the pre-existing political subdivisions of
the state and to set up the desired number of legislative districts purely
on a basis of population. The difficulty of conducting elections if legislative districts are entirely divorced from other voting divisions makes the
theoretically perfect system impossible. Clearly, voting precincts must
not be divided if election officials are to perform their duties easily and
well. To avoid confusion, Mr. A and Mr. B, residing in the same precinct and using the same ballot in all city and county elections, must also
be given the same ballot in elections of members of the legislature.
- Otherwise the distribution of ballots and the keeping of the poll books
would be impossibly complicated.
There is less reason for preserving the county as a unit, since not all
3

4
5

Ariz. Const. (1912), art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(1).
E.g., N.C. Const. (1876), art. II, §§ 4, 6.
Ore. Const. (1859), art. IV,§ 6.
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residents of the county vote in the same polling place, nor do they
always use the same ballots; in other words, the county can be divided
without too severely cutting across electoral lines. Yet most of our constitutions require adherence to county lines, and it is here that the major
cause of unequal representation arises. Indeed, in some states the counties are given seperate representation as such, just as, in the United
States Senate, the states have representation as such. This type of repre-.
sentation will be discussed in greater detail later.
Distinctly the greatest problem of apportionment is the conflict between city and country. On the one hand, it is said that an urban-dominated ·legislature will be controlled by the city political machines and
deprive the country districts of needed funds and other legislative benefits. It is said that some device is needed to assure that the urban elements, though in the majority as to population, will not occupy a majority of the seats in the legislature and control the legislative will.
On the other hand, it is urged with equal vehemence that the democratic principle requires that the cities be given their full quota of delegates, and that a predominantly rural legislature is likely to impede
important social legislation. Among today's most serious legislative
problems are those concerning labor, housing, and other subjects
peculiar to urban life, and the delegate from the country is neither directly interested in the problems nor cognizant of the factors jnvolved.
Needed legislation may be blocked by the farm organizations, which in
many states are quite as powerful as the city machines.
The usual method of meeting the rural-urban problem is to favor
the country in both houses of the legislature. But this is an evasion
rather than a solution of the problem, and obviously solves nothing, for
it takes no account of urban demands. The opposing interests should be
balanced, and a compromise reached which will take account of both.
Indeed, many unbiased observers feel that no untoward harm would
result from giving to the cities their true quota of delegates.
The rural-urban problem is most acute in states like Illinois which
have a single metropolitan area containing half the state's population.
Some compromise with the principle of exact equality is clearly desirable in this situation, for if Chicago were to receive its full share of
members in the state legislature it would virtually control all legislation. Under such circumstances it is unwise to give the urban population
its full share of delegates. A similar situation, in lesser degree, is encountered in Michigan, where half the total population is contained in
four urban counties. At the present time these counties have forty-one
percent of the membership of the house and thirty-three percent of the
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senate. 6 To assign to these four counties their proper quota of delegates
would give the other areas ·cause to complain that the state was being
unduly controlled by urban interests. On the other hand, under the
,present system the residents of these four counties can and do complain
that they are being governed by a minority of the population. Of
course, the dangers presented by the single large urban area diminish as
the territory necessary to achieve a majority of the pbpulation is increased; in a state like Michigan, with four counties containing several
·major cities and many smaller ones, there is little danger of dqminance
of the legislature by a single city. In "this situation there seems less
reason to depart from the principle of equality.
In con:q.ection with the rural-urban problem, it should be pointed
out that the effect of favoring the one group or the other is far-reaching.
Representation in party conventions is usually based on legislative districts, so that nominations fall into the hands of the same interests that
control the legislature. The undesirability of this situation is especially
evident in states where nomination is equivalent to election. Again, in
some states constitutional conventions are composed of a stated number
of delegates from each legislative district, and the unbalance of interests is likely to be reflected in the fundamental law. In Michigan, for
example, the constitutional convention is to be made up of three delegates from each senatorial district. 7 Under existing conditions the four
counties holding over fifty per cent of the population would have only
'thirty-three per cent of the delegates. 8 Thus the present plan of representation is virtually self-perpetuating, and the cities are well-nigh
powerless to achieve a change except by means of the initiated petition.
A basic problem to be settled in creating a system .Pf apportionment
is the policy to be followed in the composition of the two houses of the
legislature. The method employed for the United States Congress has
been used in some states, with representation in one house based on
population ( usually with modifications) and membership in the other
house fixed by political boundaries. It must be remembered, however,
that the federal system was the result of compromise between the large
and small states, each of which was jealous of the strength of the other.
At first it was assumed that both houses of Congress should be appor6

1940 census. The counties are Genesee, Kent, Oakland and Wayne, containing
respectively the cities of Flint, Grand Rapids, Pontiac and Detroit. For senatorial
representation, Oakland county is joined to Washtenaw to form one district. Mich. Stat.
Ann. (1936 and Supp. 1944) §§ 2.1, 2.23.
7
Mich. Const. (1908), art. XVII,§ 4.
8
See note 6, supra.
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tioned in the same way, but the small states wanted representation for
each state as such, while the large states desired representation by pop~lation. It was only after the Constitutional Convention was on the
verge of collapse that it reached the compromise which became a part
of the Constitution, with the two hourses appqrtioned by different
methods.
The conflict which the federal system was designed to meet is not
normally duplicated within a state, for there is no marked cleavage of
interests among counties as such. The intrastate conflict is rather between the rural and urban interests, and it is only to this extent that the
counties within a state may be said to represent divergent interests. The
federal system may perhaps serve as a method of balancing these
groups, since a body composed of a member from each county is almost
necessarily predominantly rural; and if the other house is actudly based
on population ( which is seldom the case-it is usually weighted in favor
of the rural areas) it will be predominantly urban. The traditional system of checks and balances will thus be preserved. But the friction
generated by two houses of widely divergent composition may outweigh the advantages of checks and balances. Perhaps it is this which
has led a number of states to apportion both houses by the same rules.
In these states, of course, the two houses are likely to represent identical interests in identical proportions, and the system of checks and balances is necessarily lessened, or even occasionally eliminated. There
will usually be at least a minimal amount of balance, however, by virtue
of the fact that two bodies of men and the individuals composing those
bodies almost inevitably have different opinions and ideas.
If it is felt that this minimal balance is not worth retaining, and if
the federal system is not desired, the logical result is unicameralism. A
discussion of the pros and cons of unicameralism is beyond the scope of
this paper, but it may be pointed out that it has been adopted in Nebraska through the efforts of the late Senator George W. Norris. 9 The
system has many advocates, including the National Municipal League,
whose Committee on State Government wrote it into its Model State
Constitution.10
Neb. Const. {1875), art. III, § 5, as amended 1934.
Model State Const. (1934), §§ 13, 14. This constitution also provides for a
system of proportional representation, but this system is so little understood that it is
probably undesirable. It has been declared unconstitutional in Michigan. Wattles ex rel.
Johnson v. Upjohn, 2II Mich. 514, 179 N.W. 335 (1920). Much has been written
on the subject of unicameralism. See, for example, BucK, MoDERNIZING OUR STATE
LEGISLATURE 25 ff. (1936); SHULL, AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH UNICAMERAL
LEGISLATURE (1937); Orfield, "The Unicameral Legislature in Nebraska," 34 MICH.
9

10
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II
SOME PURPOSEFUL INEQUALITIES

A. Inequalities Enshrined in the Constitutions
Perhaps the outstanding feature of the various constitutions is the
preservation of the county as a unit in apportionment. A common provision prohibits the dividing of counties in the formation of districts,
though some states relax this rule in the case of counties containing
sufficient population to form two or more whole districts within the
county. When there are several counties, ,each containing somewhat less
than the population quota for one member, the apportioning authority
is faced with the choice of giving each county a member, or grouping
them into units which contain more than the requisite population for
one member but not enough for two. Suppose, for example, that the
· average population per district is 100,000. If four adjacent counties
each contain a population of 7 5,ooo, they could and should be broken
into three districts of I 00,000 e~ch. But if the constitution provides that
districts shall be formed from whole counties, the four counties must
either be given four members, one to each county, or they must be
joined to form two districts, each with a population of 150,000. If the
first alternative is chosen the four counties receive more than their share
of delegates; and when, as is usually the case, the total number of members is limited, a more populous area will thereby be deprived of a
member to which it is entitled. Under the second alternative, the counties in question have less than their share of delegates. It is apparent
that any attempt at perfection is doomed to failure if counties cannot be
divided. For administrative convenience and simplicity it is probably
desirable to follow county lines as far as possible in the formation of
districts, for the county provides a workable starting-point in laying
out districts, al).d the art of gerrymandering becomes more difficult if
certain definite rules are laid down. But the trend today is away from
the county as a unit of government; and except for the comparative convenience of adhering to county lines, the principal effect of retaining
this mandate in our constitutions is to preserve the supremacy of the
rural areas. It should be made possible to join parts of counties when
necessary to avoid undue inequalities of population among districts.
Massachusetts has recognized this need, and has made it possible in the
L.

REv.

26 (1935). In general on proportional representation, see HERMANS, DE(1941); REED, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
rev. ed., 247 ff. (1934).

MOCRACY OR ANARCHY
STATES,
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formation of senatorial districts.11 Texas has accomplished the same
result in the apportionment of the house of representatives.12
The sanctity of the county is preserved in another type of limitation,
of which the North Carolina Constitution provides a typical example.
After providing that the lower house shall contain I 20 members who
shall be apportioned to the counties according to their population, a
proviso is added that "each county shall have at least one representative
in the House of Representatives, although it may not contain the requisite ratio of representation." 13 Since each of the one hundred counties
must be given a member, regardless of its population, it is clearly impossible to distribute the remaining twenty members on a true population basis. With a total population in the state of 3,571,623, the average population per representative should be 29,764. Yet fifty-five of
the one hundred counties in the state have less than this quota, and
nineteen of these lack even half of this number. One county, Camden,
has only 5,440 inhabitants. At the other end of the scale, Guilford and
Mecklenburg counties, each containing over I 50,000 population, should
receive five members each, and in fact have but four. 14 On a population
basis many other counties should be given one or two more members
than are at present allotted to them. The county line does not represent
any such cleavage of interests as would necessitate each one being represented by a member, and any approach to equality is impossible under
this rule unless the counties happen to be substantially equal in population.
Variations on this theme appear in many of the constitutions. Florida
gives three representatives to each of the five most populous counties,
two each to the next eighteen, and one each to the remaining counties.15
The possible inequalities resulting under this system are obvious; the
most populous county may have twice as many inhabitants as the second,
yet it can have no more representatives; and it can never have more
than three times as many as the least populous county, regardless of its
population. New York attains much the same result by another route.
11
Mass. Const. (1790), Amendment LXXI: " . • . And such districts shall be
formed, as nearly as may be, without uniting two counties, or parts of two or more
counties into one district."
12
Tex. Const. (1876), art. III,§ 26: " •.• When any one county has more than
sufficient population to be entitled to one or more Representatives, such Representative
or Representatives shall be apportioned to such county, and for any surplus of population
it may be joined in a Representative District with any other contiguous county or
counties."
13
N.C. Const. (1876), art. II,§ 5.
14
1940 census. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 120-2.
15
Fla. Const. (1885), art. VII, § 3.
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After setting up a constant ratio of representation for the house, it is
provided that all counties with less than one and one-half ratios shall
have one member, and all others are given two. The members remaining out of a total of one hundred and fifty are then given to the more
populous counties on the basis of their remainders above twq ratios. 16
These provisions more or less completely nullify the blanket order with
which the section opens, requiring districts to be "as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective inhabitants, excluding
aliens," for there are not enough surplus members to give the more
populous counties their full quotas.
In several states it is provided that counties with one-half or more
of a representative ratio shall be given a delegate. In Michigan, for
example, though districts for representation in.the house are not otherwise related to counties, it is provided that "each ,county, with such territory as may be attached thereto, shall be entitled to a separate repre, sentative when it has attained a population equal to a moiety of the ratio
of representation." 11 In the Michigan C~nstitution of r 83 5 members
were apportioned according to population, each county being given at
least one member; a proviso stated that newly-created counties should
be entitled to a representative only when they contained a full ratio of
population.18 Probably to liberalize this rule, the proviso relating to
new counties was modified.in tp.e 1850 constitution, so that a moiety of
the ratio was sufficient for representation and this so-called "moiety"
clause applied explicitly to counties "hereafter organized." 19 The
framers of the present Michigan Constitution of r 908 either did not
appreciate the significance of the italicized words, or they deliberately
made a substantial alteration in Michigan practice. They deleted the
words "hereafter organized," and their deletion means that seventeen

as

16
N.Y. Const. (1895), art. III, § 5, amended 1931: " •.. The quotient obtained by dividing the whole number of inhabitants of the State, excluding aliens, by
the number of members of Assembly, shall be the ratio for apportionment, which shall
be made as follows: One member of Assembly shall be apportioned to every county, including Fulton and Hamilton as' one county, containing less than the ratio and one-half
over. Two members shall be apportioned to every other county. The remaining members of Assembly shall be apportioned to the counties having more than two ratios according to the number of inhabitants, excluding aliens. Members apportioned on remainders shall be apportioned to the counties having _the highest remainders in the order
thereof respectively." For a convincing indictment of these rules, see N.Y. STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE, P-ROBLEMS RELATING TO LEGISLATIVE
ORGANIZATION AND PowERS 163 ff. (1938).
17
Mich. Const. (1908), art. V, § 3.
18
Mich. Const. (1835), art. IV,§ 4.
19
Mich. Const. ( 18 50), art, IV, § 3 Italics supplied.
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"moiety" counties were given representatives. The "moiety" clause
makes it impossible to comply with the mandate that districts contain as
nearly as possible an equal number of inhabitants, since the total mem. bership of the house is limited to one hundred members, and the more
populous areas must thereby suffer. Wayne county, containing the city
of Detroit and well over a third of the state's population, has only
twenty-seven per cent of the seats in the house. 20
·
Representation for fractional ratios becomes less unjust as the fraction approaches a whole number. In Illinois, for example, a district
must contain at least four-fifths of a full ratio. 21 Ohio has evolved an
interesting method of dealing with fractional ratios, permitting parttime representation in proportion to the fraction of the ratio claimed by
the county. 22
A constitutional limitation of a different kind is found in the progressive ratio of representation employed in several states. The Missouri Constitution, for example, after defining the ratio of representation for the house as the population divided by two hundred, provides
that "each county having one ratio, or less, shall be entitled to one
Representative; each county having two and a half times said ratio shall
be entitled to two Representatives; each county having four times said
ratio shall be entitled to three Representatives; . . . and so on above
that number, giving one additional member for every two and a half
additional ratios." 28 It will be noticed that the relative increase of population necessary to obtain an additional member rises by progressive
steps. Thus, while a second member may be had upon an increase of
one and one half ratios of population over the number for one seat, an
20
1940 census. Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1944) § 2.23. It is noteworthy that the
Michigan legislature has avoided the effect of the moiety clause to some extent in its
1943 reapportionment by joining into one district a mdiety county ;nd a neighboring
county which contains less than a moiety of the ratio. This was upheld in Stenson v.
Secretary of State, 308 Mich. 48, 13 N.W. (2d) 202 (1944). Of course this solution
is not possible where a moiety county has no contiguous county of less than a moiety.
21
lll. Const. (1870), art. IV, § 6.
22
Ohio Const ( I 8 5 I), art. XI, § 3: "When any county shall have a fraction above
the ratio, so large, that being multiplied by five, the result will be equal to OIJ.e or more
ratios, additional representatives shall be apportioned for such ratios, among the several sessions of the decennial period, in the following manner: if there be only one
1atio, a representative shall be allotted to the fifth session of the decennial period; if
there are two ratios, a representative shall be allotted to the fourth and third sessions,
1-.:spectively; if three, to the third, second, and first sessions, respectively; if four, to the
courth, third, second, and first sessions, respectively." Oklahoma has an almost identical
scheme. Okla. Const. (1907), art. V, § rn(e). New Hampshire has a similar, though
more simple, plan. N.H. Const. (1784), part II, art. 11, as amended 1877 and 1889.
28
Mo. Const. ( l 87 5), art. IV, § 2.
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increase of two ratios is necessary to rise from three to four members,
while a fifth member can be had only with an increase of two and one
half ratios. Such progressive ratios are unfavorable to the more populous counties. A preferable method is found in New Hampshire, where
towns with six hundred population are entitled to one member in the
house, with an additional member for each additional twelve hundred
population.24
Reference has already been made to the problem of the single
metropolitan area possessing half the state's population. In this situation some compromise with the principle of equality seems inescapable.
New York has evolved a solution for the problem by a provision that
"no county shall have more than one-third of all the senators; and no
two counties or the territory thereof as now organized, which are adjoining counties, or which are separated only by public waters, shall
have· more than one-half of all the senators." 25 Pennsylvania has a
more drastic provision: no city or county shall have over one-sixth of
the total number of senators. 26 In Rhode Island no city may have over
one-fourth the membership of the house, nor more than six senators.21
This device solves the problem. But if its sole purpose is to prevent the
single large metropolitan area from controlling the legislature, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island have placed unnecessarily low limits on the
number of delegates. In both states the limitation is set in motion long
before a city becomes large enough to be a menace, and the unnecessarily low quota becomes merely another method of unduly favoring the
country at the expense of the city. The New York limitation on the
aggregate representation from adjoining counties is, of course, made
neces~ary by the fact that the metropolitan area of New York City
covers five counties. It is not necessary in most other states.
A plan recently proposed in Illinois 28 has some theoretical advantages. According to this plan, the whole state is apportioned on a
population basis, except that Chicago is given an arbitrary number of
districts; there are, in addition, a number of delegates elected at large,
who are supposed to carry enough weight to prevent the city delegations
from obtaining control. But the difficulties involved in elections at large
make this scheme less alluring than it sounds. Inevitably, the ballot
N.H. Const. (1784), part II, art. 9, as amended 1877.
N.Y. Const. (1~95), art. III, § 4, as amended 1931.
26 Pa. Const. (1874), art. II,§ 16.
27 R.I. Const. (1843), Amendments XIII, XIX.
24
25

28

Elson, "Constitutional Revision and Reorganization of the General Assembly,"

33 ILL. L. REv. 15 at

22

(1938).
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must be long. If there are twenty members to be elected at large, the
ballot will carry perhaps as many as fifty or sixty names, and it is impossible for the electorate to acquaint itself with the qualifications and
records of so many men. In such a situation the electors are likely to
vote straight party tickets, with the result that one party may receive
all the at-large seats although it has scarcely more than a majority of
the electorate.
Still another method of meeting the problem of the single large
metropolitan area is an adaptation of the federal method of representation, with one house apportioned by population and the second house
apportioned on some other basis so that it may act as a check on the first
house by virtue of its composition. California has used this scheme,
making representation in the house of representatives dependent on
population, while the members of the senate are distributed according
to an area-plus-population formula. "In the formation of Senatorial
districts no county or city and county shall contain more than one Senatorial district, and the counties of small population shall be grouped in
-districts of not to exceed three counties in any one Senatorial district." 20
Under this scheme, Los Angeles county, with 40.3 per cent of the
state's population, has forty per cent of the seats in the house and 2.5
per cent in the senate.80 Thus the California plan, which was doubtless
evolved for the specific purpose of preventing the large cities from
controlling both houses, has achieved its aim. As already mentioned,
however, any scheme which makes one house predominantly urban and
the other largely rural is likely to result in friction between the two
houses. For this reason, then, the New York method of meeting ,the
problem of the single large urban area seems preferable to, the California scheme.

B. Inequalities Added by the Apportioning Body
No study of apportionment problems would be complete without a
discussion of the apportioning body. 81 Under most of the state constitutions, the apportioning agency is the legislature itself, and it is directed
to perform the duty at stated intervals, usually every five or ten years.
But there is no way of forcing the legislature to act. It is immune from
mandamus under the doctrine of separation of powers. 82 and courts
29

Cal. Const. (1879), art. IV,§ 6.
1940 census, Cal. Govt. Code (Deering, 1944) §§ 480, 491.
31
For an excellent discussion of the problems raised here, see Walter, "Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts," 37 ILL. L. REV. 20 ( l 942).
82
People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451 at 475, 40 N.E. 307
(1895). And in State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433, 146 S.W. 40 (1912),
80
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refuse to accomplish indirectly what they cannot do directly.83 Thus the
constitution can be safely ignored. In Michigan the last senatorial reapportionment took place in 1925, and there was no ·r.eapportionment of
the house from 1925 to 1943, although the constitution requires both
houses to be reapportioned every ten years.84 In Minnesota, where reappottionment is directed to be made every five years, there was none
between 1917 and 1943.35 In Illinois there has been no reapportionment since 1901, notwithstanding a constitutional mandate to reapportion every ten years.86 Some writers have suggested that this situation
might be remedied by constitutional amendment making the apportioning body subject to mandamus; to date, however, Arkansas is the only
state tq adopt this recommendation,87 and it is too early to appraise its
effect in that state.
Moreover, when the legislature actually makes an apportionment,
inequalities are likely to result. In Michigan, for example, where the
average population per representative district is 52,561, the district of
Clinton county contains but 26,691 persons, while each of the twentyseven members from Wayne county represents 74,652 persons. In
Georgi<J,, Fulton county, containing Atlanta, elects r.5 per cent of the
house, although it contains 12.6 per cent of the state's population.88
These inequalities are due to a variety of causes, some of which are
inevitable because enshrined in the constitution itself or because. of facit was held that an apportionment commission composed of the governor, secretary of
state and attorney general was not subject to mandamus since it was performing a legislative function.
33
•
In People v. Clardy, 334 Ill. 160, 165 N.E. 638 (1929), the court refused to
declare void the acts of a legislature sitting under an obsolete apportionment. The
same court, in Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928), dismissed a suit
to restrain payment of legislators' salaries, and refused to grant quo warranto in Fergus
v. Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930). Another citizen of Illinois brought
suit in the federal court, claiming exemption from income tax on the ground that the
United States had failed to carry out its guarantee of a republican form of government
in not conipelling re_apportionment in the state legislature. This suit was dismissed in
Keogh v. Neely, (C.C.A. 7th, 1931) 50 F. (2d) 685, cert. den. 284 p.s. 583, 52
S. Ct. 39 (1931). Mr. Keogh obtained even greater fame in another reapportionment
case, when in the midst of the trial he killed the opposing counsel and attempted to
shoot the judge.
84
Mich. Const. (1908), art. V, § 4; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1936 and Supp. 1944)
§§ 2.l, 2.23.
35
Minn. Const. (1857), art. IV,§ 23; Minn. Stat. Ann. (Mason, 1927 and Supp.
1944) § 9.
36
Ill. Const. (1870), art IV, § 6; Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1944), c. 46,
§ 1 57•
37
Ark. Const. (1874), Amendment 23, § 5.
38
1940 census. Ga. Laws 1941, p. 348.
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tors beyond the control of the apportioning body. But others are avoidable. The party in power may be expected to manipulate the districts
to insure its continuance in control, and no member is likely to vote for a
reapportionment which will eliminate his own seat. Though courts possess the power to set aside an act which is contrary to the constituti,;m,
they have been loath to do so unless it :flagrantly disregards constitutional mandates, feeling that they should not interfere with the exercise
of a discretionary function of the legislature. Most of the apportionment
acts which have been set aside by the courts were held unconstitutional
either because they created grossly unequal districts, or because they
violated some mandatory rule of the constitution, such as a prohibition
against dividing counties.39 In other cases the courts have refused to
interfere, even when a more equitable apportionment might conceivably
have been made, recognizing that perfect equality is impossible, and
allowing reasonable latitude for legislative discretion.40 One court
based its refusal tQ invalidate the act on the ground that to do so would
revive an earlier and even more objectionable act. 41 AIJ.other court realistically admitted the necessity of legislative compromises in order to
get any act passed.42
Several states have remedied the situation by creating independent
boards with power to apportion either in the first instance, or in case the
legislature fails to act. The personnel of these boards varies from state
to state, but they usually consist of three or four executive officers of the
state. Florida has a unique provision to the effect that if the legislature
fails to act the governor shall call a special session which shall sit until
reapportionment is e:ffected.43 The independent board is probably preferable to the Florida method, since self-interest is removed, or at least
rendered less potent . .This board can and should be made subject to
mandamus, and should be as nonpartisan as possible. ·In no other way
can the duty of reapportionment be enforced.
39
Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Colo. 425, 37 P. (2d) 757 (1934); Parker v. State,
133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 119 (1893); Brooks v. State, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980
(1903); Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W. 865 (1907); Stiglitz v. Shardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W. (2d) 315 (1931); Rogers v. Morgan, 127 Neb. 456,
256 N.W. 1 (1934); Giddings v. Blacker, 91 Mich. 1, 51 N.W. 692 (1892); State
v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892).
40
People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N.E. 307 (1895);
Prouty v. Stover, II Kan. 183 (1873); People ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 135 N.Y. 473,
31 N.E. 921 (1892); Bowman v. Dammann, 209 Wis. 21, 243 N.W. 481 (1932).
41
People ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 135 N.Y. 473, 31 N.E. 921 (1892).
42
Bowman v. Dammann, 209 Wis. 21, 243 N.W. 481 (1932).
43
Fla. Const. (1887), art. VII, § 3.

1104

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43

APPENDIX
TABLE SHOWING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR APPORTIONMENT
ALABAMA: Const. (1901), Art. IV, § 50; Art. IX,§ 197-200.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; no county divided. Not more than
35 members, and not less than 1/4 or more than 1/3 of the number of
representatives.
House: Among counties by population; each county is entitled to at least
1 member. Not more than 105 members, except that new counties are
entitled to a member.
Apportiomng Agemy: Legislature.
ARIZONA: Const. (1912), Art. IV, pt. 2, pt. I (1).
Basis of A pportiomnent:
Senate: Among counties, the number for each county fixed by constitution.
19 members.
House: Among counties, I member for each 2500 votes or major fraction
thereof cast for governor at last preceding election; each county is entitled to at least I member; no county shall have less than the number
entitled to if computed on basis of 1930 election.
Apportioning Agency: Within each county by board of supervisors.
ARKANSAS: Const. (1874), Arndt. 23 .
.Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; no county divided. 35 members.
House: Each county is entitled to at least one member; members remaining
are distributed to more populous counties in accordance with a ratio to be
determined by population. I oo members.
Apportioning Agency: Board of apportionment {governor, secretary of state,
attorney general). Subject to mandamus and to review by supreme court.
CALIFORNIA: Const. {1879), Art. IV, § 6.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts; no county or city and county to contain more th'an
one district; counties of small population grouped but not more than three
counties in a district; population excludes persons ineligible to become
U.S. citizens. 40 members.
House: Among districts by population, excluding persons ineligible to become U.S. citizens; no county or city and county divided unless it contains sufficient population to form two or iii.ore districts. So members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature; or if it fails, a reapportionment commission
{lieutenant governor, attorney general, surveyor general, secretary of state,
superintendent of public instruction).
COLORADO: Const. (1876), Art. V, §§ 45-47.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population, according to ratios to be fixed by law;
no county divided. 26 members.
House: Same as Senate. 49 members. Both houses may be increased in
size, the aggregate not to exceed 100, and the same proportion to be kept
as near as may be.
Apportioning Agemy: Legislatur_e.
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CoNNEcncuT: Const. (1818), Amdts. XV, XVIII, XXXI.

Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; no county divided; each county is
entitled to at least one member. 24-36 members.
House: Among towns; towns with 5000 population have two members; all
others have present representation. Special rules for the case of a new town
created from an old one.
Apportiomng Agency: Legislature for senate; no provision for house.
DELAWARE: Const. (1897), Art. II, § 2.

Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts, the number of each district fixed by constitution.
17 members.
House: Same as senate. 35 members.
FLORIDA: Const. (1885), Art. VII,§§ 2-5.

Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; no county divided. By Art. VII,
§ 3, 38 members; but cf. Art. VII, § 2.
House: 3 members to each of the five most populous counties, 2 to each of
the next I 8, I to each remaining county. Not over 68 members.
Apportion,mg Agency: Legislature; or if it fails, governor shall call special session
which shall sit until apportionment is accomplished.
GEORGIA: Const. (1877), Art. III,§ 2 (1-3), as amended;§ 3 (1-2).

Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; neither number of districts nor
number of senators from each district shall be increased. 52 members.
House: By Art. III, § 3 (1), 3 members to each of the 8 most populous
counties; 2 each to the next 30; 1 each to the remaining counties. But
cf. Art. III, § 3 (2).
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
IDAHO:

Const. (1889), Art. III,§§ 4-5, Amdt. 18.

Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: By Amendment 18, 1 member to each county; But cf. Art. III, § 5.
House: Among districts provided by law; each county is entitled to at least
1 member; no county divided. Not more than 3 times as large as the
senate.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature for house; no provision for senate.
ILLINOIS: Const. (1870), Art. IV, §§ 6-8.

Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; no district to contain less than 4/ 5
ratio; districts to be bounded by county lines; county with 1¾ ratio may
be divided into two districts, and may receive I additional member for
each full ratio over two. 5 1 members.
House: 3 members to each senatorial district; each voter may cast as many
votes as there are members to be elected, and may cast them all for l
candidate. 3 times the number of senators.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
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INDIANA: Const. ( l 8 5 l), Art. IV, §§ 2, 4-6.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among counties according to male population over 21; no county
divided. Not over 50 members.
House: Among counties according to male population over 21. Not over
100 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
lowA: Const. (1857), Art. III, § 37. Amdts. of 1904, No. 2, and 1928.
BtJSi.r of Apportionment:
.
Senate: Among counties or districts by population; no county divided; no
• county is entitled to more than one senator. 50 members.
House: Each county is entitled to l member; the 9 most populous counties
have l additional member, if their population exceeds l 3/5 ratio, (a
ratio being population of state divided by number of counties); no county
divided. Not more than 108 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
KANSAS: Const. (1859), Art. II, § 2, as amended; Art. X, §§ 1-2.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: By population. Not over 40 members.
House: Art. II, § 2, as amended in 1873, 1 member to each.county casting
250 legal votes at last general election. But cf. Art: X, § I. Not over
1 2 5 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
KENTUCKY: Const. (1891) § 33.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; no county divided unless it includes
more than one district; if population inequalities are unavoidable, advantage shall be given to districts having the largest territory. 38 members.
House: Same as senate with additional rule that not more than 2 counties
may be joined to form a district. 100 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
Lou1s1ANA: Const. ( 192 I), Art. III, § 2, 3, 5, as amended.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts, but no basis is given; no parish, except Orleans,
divided. Not over 39 members.
'
House: By Art. III, § 5, as amended, the number for each parish fixed by
constitution. IOO members. But cf. Art. III, § 2.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
MAINE: Const. (1819), Amdts. XXV, XXXIX, LIII.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among counties by population, excluding aliens and Indians not
taxed; I member to counties of 30,000 or less; 2 to counties from 30,000
to 60,000; 3 to counties from 60,000 to I 20,000; 4 to counties from
120,000 to 240,000; beyond this, 5 members.
House: Among towns by population, excluding aliens and Indians not
taxed; 1 member to towns of 1500; 2 to towns of 3750; 3 to towns of
6700; 4 to towns of 10,500; 5·to towns of 15,000; 6 to towns of 20,250;
7 to towns of 26,250 or more. Special rules for towns under 1500. l 51
'members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
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Const. (1867), Art. III, §§ 2, 4 as amended, 5.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: 1 member to each county; 6 to city of Baltimore.
House: 2 members to counties of 18,000 population or less; 3 to counties
of l 8,000 to 28,000; 4 to counties of 28,000 to 40,000; 5 to counties
of 40,000 to 55,000; 6 to counties over 55,000. Each of the 6 Baltimore
districts has the same number of members as the largest county.
Apportioning Agency: Governor for house; no provision for senate.
MASSACHUSETTS: Const. (179oj, Arndt. LXXI.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts acco_rding to number of legal voters; no town or
ward of a city divided; districts shall be formed, as near as may be, without uniting 2 counties or parts of 2 or more counties in 1 district. 40
members.
House: Among counties according to number of legal voters; county commissioners divide county into as many districts as it has members. 240
members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
MICHIGAN: Const. (1908), Art. V, §§ 2-4.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; no county divided unless equitably
entitled to 2 or more members. 32 members.
House: Among districts by population; counties with a moiety of the population ratio are entitled to a member. 64-100 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
MINNESOTA: Const. (1857), Art. IV, §§ 2, 23, 24.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; excluding non-taxable Indians; no
representative district divided; representation shall never exceed l member for every 5,000 inhabitants.
House: Among districts by population, excluding non-taxable Indians;
representation shall never exceed 1 member for every 2,000 inhabitants.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
MISSISSIPPI: Const. (1890), Art. XIII, § 256.
Basis of A pportiomnent:
Senate: Among counties, not less than 30 or more than 45. But cf. Art.
XIII, § 255.
House: Among counties, each county to have at least l member; counties
are joined in 3 groups, each group to have at least 44 members. 100-13 3
members. But cf. Art XIII, § 254.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
MISSOURI: Const. (1875), Art. IV, §§ 2-9.
Basis of A pportiowment:
Senate: Among districts by population; no county divided unless entitled to
more than l member. 34 members.
House: l member to counties with l ratio of population or less; 2 to counties with 2¼ ratios; 3 to counties with 4 ratios; 4 to counties with 6
ratios; and so on, with I additional member for each 2¼ additional
ratios; county court divides county into as many districts as there are
members to be elected.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature; or if it fails, governor, secretary of state, and
attorney general.
MA1tYLAND:

II08

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43

MONTANA: Const. (1889), Art. V, § 4; Art. VI, §§ 2-5.
Basis of Apportiomnent:
Senate: I member to each county.
House: Among districts by population, according to ratios to be fixed by law;
no county divided.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
NEBRASKA: Const. (1875), Art. III,§§ 5, 6, as amended.
Basis of Apportirmment:
Unicameral Legislature: Among districts by population excluding aliens;
any county containing population sufficient to entitle it to 2 or more
members shall be divided into separate districts by population. 30-50
members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
NEVADA: Const. (1864), Art. I,§ 13; Art. XV,§§ 6, 13.
Basis of A pportirmment:
Senate: By population. Total of both houses not to exceed 75.
House: By population. ·
Apportioning Agency: No provision.
NEW HAMPSHIRE: Const. (1784), Art. II, §§ 9, II, 25, 26, as amended.
Basis of Apporticmment:
Senate: Among districts according to proportion of direct taxes paid. 24
members.
House: I member to towns of 600 population; 2 to towns of 1800; and so
on, with I additional member for each additional I 200; towns of less
than 600 have a member a proportionate part of the time.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature for senate; no provision for house.
NEW JERSEY: Const. (1844), Art. IV, §§ 2 (1), 3 (1), as amended.
Basis of Apportiomnent:
Senate: I member to each county.
House: Among counties by population; each county is entitled to at least
I member. Not over 60 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature for house.
NEW MEX1co': Const. (19II), Art. IV, §§ 3, 4.
Basis of A pportiowment:
Senate: Among districts by population. 24 members.
House: Among districts by population. 49 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
NEW YoRK: Const. (1895), Art. III,§§ 2, 4, 5, as amended.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population, excluding aliens; no county divided
unless entitled to z or more members; no county shall have 4 or more
members unless it has a full ratio for each member; no county shall have
,over 1/3 of all the senators, and no 2 adjoining counties shall have over
¼ of all the senators. 50 members except in special circumstances.
House: Among counties by population, excluding aliens; 1 member to each
county with less than ¼ ratio; 2 members to every other county; remaining members are assigned to counties with more than 2 ratios, according
to population. I 50 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature; subject to review by supreme court.
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NoRTH CAROLINA: Const. (1876), Art. II,§§ 3-6.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population, excluding aliens and Indians not
taxed; no county divided unless entitled to two or more members. 50
members.
House: Among counties by population, excluding aliens and Indians not
taxed; each county at least one member; additional member for each full
ratio; remaining members are assigned to counties having the largest fractional ratios. 120 members.
Apportio11Jng Agency: Legislature.

NoRTH DAKOTA: Const. (1889), Art. H, §§ 29, 32, 35.
Basis of Apportiowment:
Senate: Among districts by population; no county divided. Number to be
fixed by legislature.
House: Apportioned to and elected at large from each senatorial district by
population. 60-140 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.

OHio: Const. (1851), Art. XI,§§ 1-11.

Baris of A pportiowment:
Senate: Districts are fixed by constitution and senators are apportioned to
these districts by population, following the same rules as for the house in
apportioning fractions and annexing districts; any county having a full
ratio of population becomes a separate district if the district from which
it is taken has a full ratio.
.,.
House: I member to counties with ¼ ratio; 2 to counties with 1¾ ratio;
3 to counties with 3 ratios; I more for each additional ratio; but each
county shall have I member; counties with a fraction above the ratio may
send a member a proportionate amount of the time; any county having a
full ratio of population becomes a separate district if the district from
which it is taken has a full ratio; any county previously having a representative and falling below the ratio shall be attached to an adjoining
county.
Apportioning Agency: Governor, auditor, and secretary of state, or any two of
them.

OKLAHOMA: Const. (1907), Art. V, §§9a, 9b,

IO.

Basis of Apportiowment:
Senate: Among districts by population; no county divided, unless entitled to
2 or more members. 44 members, except in special circumstances.
House: I member to counties with ¼ ratio; 2 to counties with 1¾ ratio;
I more for each additional full ratio; counties with less than ¼ ratio are
joined to adjacent county; no county divided unless entitled to 2 or
more members; counties with fraction above the ratio may send a member
a proportionate part of the time.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature; subject to approval of governor and review by
supreme court.
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OREGON: Const. (1859), Art. IV, §§ 2, 5, 6, 7.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among counties by white population; county with ¼ ratio 1s entitled to l member; co_unty with less than¼ ratio is attached to adjoining
county; no county divided. 16-30 members.
House: Same as senate, except that there is no prohibition against dividing.
counties. 34-60 members. The two houses must always be kept in the
ratio of 16 to 34·
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
PENNSYLVANIA: Const. (1874), Art. II, §§ 16, 18. ·
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; counties with l or more full ratios
are entitled to l member for each full ratio, and ,l for additional 3/ 5
ratio; county may form a separate district when it has 4/ 5 ratio ( or ¼
ratio if adjoining counties are each entitled to a member); no city or
county to have over 1/6 the total number of senators; no county divided
unless it is entitled to 2 or more members. 50 members.
House: Among counties by population; each county at least 1 member; 1
member for each full ratio, and if there are less than 5 ratios, an additional member when the surplus exceeds ¼ ratio; any city entitled to
more than 4 members and any county having over 100,000 population
shall be divided into districts, but no district shall elect more than 4
representatives.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
RHODE ISLAND: cor{:t. (1843), Amdts. XIII, XIX.
Basis of Apportionment:
Se,uzte: 1 member to each town; and any town having more than 25,000
qualified electors is 1entitled to an additional member for each 25,000
qualifi'ed electors, always allowing 1 additional member for a fraction
exceeding ¼ ratio; but no town shall_ have more than 6 members; towns
are divided into districts by population.
House: On basis of population, always allowing l _member for a fraction
exceeding¼ ratio; each town and city is entitled to at least l member;
no town or city may have more than ¾ the total membership; towns
and citi_es are divided into districts by population. Not over 100 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
SouTH CAROLINA: Const. (1895), Art. I, § 2; Art. III, §§ 3-6.
Basis of Apportionment: ·
Senate: 1 member to each county.
House: Among counties by population, but each county is entitled to at
least l member. l 24 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legisfature.
SouTH DAKOTA: Const. (1889), Art. III, § 2 as amended, § 5.
. Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: By population, excluding soldiers and officers of the U.S. Army and
Navy. 25-35 members.
House: Same ·as senate. 50-75 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature, or if it fails, governor, superintendent of public instruction, presiding judge of supreme court, attorney general, secretary of
state.
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TENNESSEE: Const. (1870), Art. II,§§ 4-6.
Basis of Apportiowment:
Senate: Among districts or counties according to number of qualified electors; no single county divided; any fraction lost by a county in the
apportionment of the house shall be made up in the senate, as near as
may be practicable. Not to exceed 1/3 the number of representatives.
House: Among counties or districts according to number of qualified electors; any county with 2/3 ratio shall be entitled to I member. Not over
75 members until population is 1,500,000; and never over 99.
A pporti011MJ.g Agency: Legislature.

TEXAS: Const. (1876), Art. III, §§ 2, 25, 26, 26a (adopted 1936), 28.
Basis of Apportiowment:
Senate: Among districts according to number of qualified electors; no single
county shall be entitled to more than I senator. 3 I members.
House: Among districts by population; any county with a full ratio shall
form a separate district; if a county has a surplus over a ratio, part may
be joined to an adjoining county to form a district; no county may have
more than 7 members unless its population exceeds 700,000, in which
case it may have I additional member for each 100,000 in excess of
700,000. 93-150 members, but ratio may not exceed I member for
every I 5,000 population.
Apporti011MJ.g Agency: Legislature.

UTAH: Const. (1895), Art. IX, §§ 2-4.
Basis of A pportiowment:
Senate: Among districts by population, according to ratios to be fixed by
law; no county divided unless entitled to 2 or more members. 18-3q
members.
House: Among districts by population, according to ratios to be fixed by law;
each county shall be entitled to at least I member. Not less than twice
or more than three times as large as the senate.
Apporti011MJ.g Agency: Legislature.

VERMONT: Const. (1793), Art II, §§ 13, 18, as amended.
Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among counties by population, r_egard being always had to the
counties with the largest fraction, and each county being given at least
I member. 30 members.
House: One member from each inhabited town.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature for senate.

VIRGINIA: Const. (1902), Art. IV,§§ 41, 42, 43 as amended.
Basis of Apportiowment:
Senate: No rules given, beyond requiring apportionment every
33-40 members.
House: Same as senate. 90-100 members.
Apportioning Agency: No provision.

IO
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WASHINGTON: Const. (1889), Art. II,§§ 2, 3.

Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population, excluding Indians not taxed, soldiers,
sailors and officers of the U.S. Army and Navy in active service; no representative district shall be divided. 1/3 to ¼ the size of the house.
House: Among districts by population, excluding Indians not taxed, soldiers,
sailors and officers of the U.S. Army and Navy in active service. 63-99
members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
,.
WEST VIRGINIA: Const. (1872), Art. VI, §§ 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 50.

Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among districts by population; districts shall be ·bounded by county
lines; legislature may submit a plan of proportional representation in the
senate to the people. 24 members.
House: Among districts; any county having 3/5 ratio forms a district; any
remaining members are assigned to counties and districts having the largest remainders. 6 5 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
WiscoNsIN: Const. (1848), Art. IV, §§ 2, 3 as amended.

Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: By population, excluding Indians not taxed, and soldiers and officers
of the U.S. Army and Navy; ¼ to 1/3 the size of the house.
House: Same as senate. 54-100 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
WYOMING: Const. (1889), Art. III, §§ 3, 48, 49.

Basis of Apportionment:
Senate: Among counties by population according to ratios to be fixed by
law; each county entitled to at least I member.
House: Same as senate, but no county divided. Not less than twice or more
than three times size of senate.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.
MoDEL STATE CONSTITUTION: §§ 13, 14.

Basis of Apportionment:
Unicameral Legislature: Among districts in proportion to population; elected
by the system of proportional representation with the single transferable
vote; no district shall be assigned less than 5 members.
Apportioning Agency: Legislature.

